University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 36
Number 1 Fall 2005

Article 9

2005

Recent Developments: Moore v. State: A Person
Who Downloads Child Pornography Using a
Computer, Absent Any Involvement in Its Creation
or Distribution, Does Not Commit a Felony in
Violation of Section 11-207(A)(3) of the Criminal
Law Article
Kate E. Stewart

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stewart, Kate E. (2005) "Recent Developments: Moore v. State: A Person Who Downloads Child Pornography Using a Computer,
Absent Any Involvement in Its Creation or Distribution, Does Not Commit a Felony in Violation of Section 11-207(A)(3) of the
Criminal Law Article," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 36 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol36/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MOORE v. STATE: A PERSON WHO DOWNLOADS CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY USING A COMPUTER, ABSENT ANY
INVOLVEMENT IN ITS CREATION OR DISTRIBUTION,
DOES NOT COMMIT A FELONY IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 11-207(A)(3) OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE
By: Kate E. Stewart
Upon its own initiative, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
review de novo a ruling of the circuit court, holding that a person who
uses a computer to download visual representations of a minor
engaged in obscene acts or sexual conduct commits a misdemeanor,
rather than a felony. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 879 A.2d 1111
(2005). In so holding, the Court clarified an existing felony statute
criminalizing child pornography by finding that the legislature did not
intend the statutory phrase "use [of] a computer to depict or describe"
to encompass the use of a computer to download and possess. !d.
On October 7, 2003, police served a search warrant upon Jonathan
G. Moore ("Moore") for his residence. The police read Moore his
Miranda rights, and he voluntarily waived them. In the search,
detectives found a computer which Moore acknowledged as being his.
Moore assisted the detectives in examining the computer by showing
them a file on the computer containing photographic images and
videos of female children under sixteen years of age engaged in sexual
acts. The police also found computer print-outs and a floppy disk with
pornographic images. Moore voluntarily stated that he downloaded
the material from a website beginning in August 2003 for his personal
use, but added that he had not created or distributed any of the images.
Moore was indicted for violating sections 11-207(a)(3) and 11208(a) of the Maryland Criminal Law Article. Count I of the
indictment charged Moore under the felony statute, § ll-207(a)(3),
with using a computer "to depict and describe" a minor engaged in
sexual acts. Count II charged Moore under the misdemeanor statute,
§11-208(a), with knowingly possessing various visual representations
of a minor engaged in sexual conduct. Moore pled not guilty to both
counts.
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On June 21, 2004, the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County
convicted him of both counts of the indictment. Moore appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland solely as to his felony
conviction under Count I. However, before the Court considered the
case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, upon its own initiative,
granted certiorari to resolve the correct interpretation of the language
ofMd. Crim. Law§ 11-207(a)(3).
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by reviewing the plain
language of the felony statute. Section 11-207(a)(3) states that a
person may not "use a computer to depict or describe" a minor
involved in obscene, sadomasochistic, or sexual conduct. !d. at 452,
879 A.2d at 1114. Moore argued on appeal that the statute was
ambiguous and his conduct did not violate the§ ll-207(a)(3) because
the statute proscribes the creation of obscene materials using a
computer, as evidenced by legislative history. !d. at 456, 879 A.2d at
1116. In addition, Moore contended that the misdemeanor child
pornography statute already criminalized the use of a computer to
possess obscene materials. !d. at 456, 879 A.2d at 1116.
In order to resolve any ambiguities and determine the meaning of
the statute, the Court engaged in interpretation of the phrase "use [of]
a computer to depict or describe" by examining the legislative intent.
!d. at 452-53, 879 A.2d at 1114. In its examination, the Court
considered legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. !d. at
452-53, 879 A.2d at 1114.
The Court began by discussing the plain language of the statute,
observing that Webster's Dictionary defines "depict" and "describe"
as representing by drawing, writing, or otherwise; whereas
"download" denotes the transferring or copying of data. !d. at 457,
879 A.2d at 1116-7. The Court stated that the ordinary usage of
"depict" and "describe" is inconsistent with the action of downloading.
!d. at 457, 879 A.2d at 1116-7. Thus, the Court of Appeals accepted
Moore's understanding of the words "depict" and "describe." !d. at
457, 879 A.2d at 1116-7.
In addition, the Court stated that the legislature's choice to employ
the active verb forms of the words "depict" and "describe" indicates
legislative intent to criminalize actions involved in creating
pornographic materials. !d. at 458, 879 A.2d 1117. When used in
their passive form, as "depiction" or "description," the words imply a
previously created image, as is consistent with the word choice in the
misdemeanor statute,§ 11-208(a). !d. at 458, 879 A.2d 1117. Section
11-208(a) prohibits possession of an image "depicting" child
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pornography, thus prohibiting possession of an image that has already
been depicted. Id. at 458-59, 879 A.2d at 1117-8. The misdemeanor
statute, the Court decided, encompasses downloading because an
image has already been depicted when a person downloads it. !d. at
459, 879 A.2d at 1118.
In addition, the Court of Appeals found the Illinois Legislature's
interpretation of its own statutes instructive. !d. at 459-60, 879 A.2d
1118. In its distinction between the verb "depict" and the passive
tense forms - "depiction" and "depicting" - the Illinois Legislature
defined the phrase "depict by computer" to mean "to generate or
create ... " !d. at 459-60, 879 A.2d 1118. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland thus concluded that the plain language of the statutory
phrase "to depict or describe" was unambiguous, and that the
legislature intended the felony statute to proscribe the use of a
computer to create pornographic images. !d. at 460, 879 A.2d at
1118-9 (emphasis added).
The Court also examined Maryland legislative history to support its
finding. A letter from an assistant attorney general indicated that the
statute targets child pornography producers and distributors. Id. at
460, 879 A.2d at 1119. The Court noted that the Maryland General
Assembly first criminalized child pornography in 1978, but mere
possession of child pornography was not criminalized until 1992 with
the passage of a misdemeanor statute, further evidencing legislative
intent to target the pornography industry with the felony statute. Id. at
462, 879 A.2d at 1120. The Court recognized that the legislature first
addressed the use of computers in child pornography in 1996 when it
amended what is now § 11-207(a)(3) to include, among the verbs
"photographs" and "films," the phrase "depicts or describes," further
implying that the statute proscribes authorship, not downloading or
possession, of pornographic material. Id. at 446, 879 A.2d at 1122.
By holding that a person who downloads child pornography for
personal possession does not commit a felony, the Court of Appeals
has effectively separated the felony and misdemeanor child
pornography statutes by identifying the intended targets of each statute
according to the level of involvement in child pornography. Those
who simply possess child pornography will only be charged with a
misdemeanor, as long as there is no evidence of distribution or
creation of child pornography. The felony statute was intended to
target the child pornography industry and encompasses more than
mere possession. The Court recognized an important distinction
between a user who only possesses child pornography and an
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individual who promotes the child pornography industry by creating or
distributing pornographic material.

